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4
UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRANT BEHAVIOR IN
DENMARK: THE IMMIGRANT ENCLAVE AND
EMPLOYMENT RATE PARADOX
Andrew Christensen
Immigrant enclaves and en'lployment rates present a paradox for policymakers in
Denmark.1 In 1999, only two countries had a larger employment gap between the
immigrant and native-born population than in Denmark (Roseveare and Jorgensen 2004 ,
14). Today, no other country has a larger employment gap between the inunigrant/ nativeborn populations than in Denmark (Liebig 2007, 10). Since 1999, non-western inunigrant
enclaves have continued to develop just as the employment gap between native and foreign
populations has increased (Olsen and Hansen 2001 , 23/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006 , 49) . From
these trends, one could conveniently assert that enclaves worsen il11lnigrant employment
rates. But other evidence complicates this picture. The paradox is that while immigrant
enclaves have low employment rates, itnInigrants that relocate to enclaves have high
employment rates (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 411Danun and Rosholm 2005,22). Or more
simply, why do inunigrant enclaves seem to simultaneously hurt and help immigrant
employment rates? To find out why, this paper will investigate both parts of the paradox. It
will investigate why inunigrants who relocate to enclaves have high employment rates, and
exalnine why immigrant enclaves have low employment rates. This paper asserts that
inIDligrants relocate to enclaves for access to integration resources and co-ethnic networks,
and that refugees largely account for low employment rates in immigrant enclaves. This
assertion suggests a way countries can improve inmligration policy.
By this assertion, this paper challenges two underlying ideas behind many EU
member-state illlnligrant-placement policies. 2 The first idea is that an equal geographic
distribution of inIDligrants evens out costs among municipalities, increases the rate of
integration, and improves employment probabilities for inunigrants (Nielsen and Jensen
2006 , 28/ Liebig 2007 , 17/ Danun and Rosholm 2005,2) . The second idea is that itnIlligrant
enclaves slow the rate of integration and decrease inIDligrant employment opportunities
(Olsen and Hansen 2001 , 30) . This paper calls these two ideas into question with two
observations. First, inunigrant enclaves unexpectedly lead to positive economic and
integration outcomes for non-refugees. In order to maxinlize these outcomes, policy should
place non-refugees according to their preference and where integration resources are most
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effective. Second, enclaves have low employm ent ra tes b ecause they have large populations
of refu gees. In order to counter this trend, policy sh ould distribute refu gees evenly
throughout the country and conti nue to foc us on reso urces for refu gees.
T his paper divides th e enclave-employm ent paradox into two parts. Accordingly,
section on e addresses why immigrants w ho relocate have high employment rates, and
section two addresses w hy inunigrant enclaves still have low employment rates. Section 1. 1
reviews recent literature's claims about the causes and consequences of immigrant enclaves,
lays out this paper's m ethod fo r testing these claims, and describes this paper's hypothesis and
causal logic. Section 1.2 prese nts evidence for tlus hyp othesis, and section 1.3 gives some
prelinunary conclusions. Section two addresses low employm ent in imnligrant enclaves.
1 .1 IMMIGRANT CULTURE, DANISH INSTITUTIONS, AND A DIRE FUTURE

R ecent literature gives two explanations for w hy imnugrant enclaves em erge and one
prediction fo r w hat enclaves mean for the future. The first explanation identifies inmugrant
culture as the root cause, the second explanation suggests that institutio ns are the cause. B oth
predict that, without dramatic changes, D enmark is h eaded toward a dire future. The first
explanation assumes that immigrants congregate for primarily cultural reasons, or m ore
precisely, that their conunon Islanuc religion gives inmugrants strong incentives to create
close conmmnities (Camre 2007, 195). T his ratio nale assumes that living in an ethnic enclave
strengthens an imm igrant's sense of security, solidarity and identity (D anun and R oshohn
2005 , 19). Trus explanation offers two solutions to the problems imnligrant enclaves
potentially pose. It presents massive culture chan ge or complete repatriation to the h om e
country as the only viable solutions (Camre 2007 , 211 / N annestad and Svendsen 2005, 29).
Both of these options would be H erculean and costly tasks . If, as the cultural approach
contends, these are the only options, D anish society faces a serious, and potentially
paralyzing, dilenuna.
T he second explanatio n suggests that bad institutio ns cause inmugrant enclaves. Trus
approac h argues that integration m easures h ave n ot only been na·i ve, but also
counterproductive. For example, Bawer claim s that policy has caused " pillarization," or the
segm enting of society into ethnic groups.3 Imnugratio n policy, according to Bawer, often
exposes a type of latent European bigotry that, on the one hand, embraces diversity w hile
harboring a fear of foreigners on the other (2006,74). This explanation essentially accepts
the cultural approach , but adds that poor policy has exacerbated the problem of imnugrant
enclaves. Whatever their differences, bo th viewpoints predict catastrophic econ omic
consequences and poor integration outcom es if enclaves continue to develop (Camre 2007 ,
196/ Bawer 2006,70) . These two explanations claim that either institutions or culture cause
inunigrant enclaves. T his paper will test these two explanations by looking at inunigrant
relocation behavior.
A look at inunigrant relocation behavior w ill deternune w hether culture or
institutions cause imnugrant enclaves to fo rm. R elocatio n is an inu1ugrant's choice to m ove
away fro m the policy- assigned place of residen ce. D anish policy, as previously mention ed ,
places inll1ugrants according to an equal geograpruc distribution, so the individual choice to
relocate provides a uniqu e access point to analyze inunigrant preferences (see appendix A).
Two patterns em erge w hen looking at inmugrant relocatio n behavior. First, inmugrants that
participate in an integration program are less likely to relocate during the first two years in
D enmark, and m ore likely to relocate after the first two yea rs. Conversely, inunigrants that
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do not participate in an integration program are more likely to move during the first two
years in Denmark, and less likely to move after the first two years (Nielsen and Jensen 2006,
31). In other words, integration prograuls seem to affect when an immigrant relocates. A
second relocation pattern emerges regarding place of residence and size of municipality.
When an inllnigrant's place of residence is in a small municipality, the immigrant is more
likely to relocate. Conversely, when place of residence is in a large municipality, immigrants
are less likely to relocate (Dan1l11 and Rosholm 2005, 22). This suggests that the
characteristics of large and small municipalities are potential causes for relocation among
inllnigrants. These two relocation patterns indicate that institutions such as municipality
characteristics and integration programs are plausible causes for enclaves to form.
Accordingly, institutions constitute my first independent variable in this question. I
divide institutions into three categories: municipal integration resources, Denmark's
immigrant-placement policy, and underlying labor market institutions. Denmark's municipal
integration resources offer recent arrivals a variety of ways to improve their employability. I
define municipal integration resources as Denmark's post-1999 job training and language
education programs. This paper measures labor market institutions in terms of municipal
unemployment rates. This assumes that municipal unemployment rates are fairly good
markers for underlying labor market institutions. Denm.ark uses a placement policy for
persons that arrive as refugees. This policy distributes Denmark's annual intake of refugees
using regional quotas. Between 1986 and 1997 , the dispersal policy provided 90% of
refugees with their initial place of residence (Liebig 2007, 17) . If I find that institutions
account for most of the relocation patterns among in1l1ugrants, I will accept the institutional
explanation for why in1l1ugrant enclaves develop.
Inllnigrant culture is my second independent variable. I define i1lllnigrant culture
simply as the desire to live in a residential district where the foreign-born population is at
least 50%. For a recent arrival, co-ethnic networks are a valuable resource for finding a job.
But if culture causes in1l1ugrant enclaves to form, finding a job should not be the sole
incentive to live am.ong co- ethnics. Thus if culture is truly a cause, employment
opportunities should not completely account for relocation behavior among in1l1ugrants. In
other words, if I find that jobs do not account for most relocation behavior among
in1l1ugrants, I will not reject the cultural explanation. If institutions cause enclaves to form ,
the incentives from institutions should affect relocation behavior more than the incentives
to live among co-ethnics. From the evidence in the next section, this paper does not reject
the cultural explanation, accepts the institutional explanation and asserts that the prediction
of a dire future for Denmark is exaggerated.
1.2

INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS AND POSITIVE OUTCOMES

Data on municipality size, employment rates, and relocation support the institutional
explanation for why enclaves form. Men who live in smaller municipalities, compared to
men who reside in a large municipality, have a 33% to 84% higher relocation rate; for
women, the corresponding rates are 66% and 102% (Danlln and Rosholm 2005, 22). In
other words, larger municipalities have lower rates of relocation, and smaller municipalities
have higher rates of relocation. This evidence can support both the institutional and cultural
explanation for relocation.
To explain this correlation between size of municipality and rate of relocation, the
institutional approach argues that municipal integration resources might affect the relocation
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rate. This is because smaller municipalities often lack integration resources for incoming
immigrants due to either a lack of experience or declining numbers of immigrants. Smaller
numbers of immigrants make it difficult to gen erate scale economies for j ob training and
language education (Liebig 2007, 62). T his might give incentive for inulligrants to shop for
better options in larger municipalities that have well-established scale economies and a
broader ra nge of vocati onal and language educatio n resources. In other words, the
institutional app roach argues that integration resources strongly influence an inunigrant's
decision to m ove to larger municipalities.
Nielsen and Jensen 's findings support this institutio nal explanatio n. They compare the
relative effects of the post- 1999 integration program and municipality size on inulligrant
relocation rates. T hey find that 6% of inulligrants in the program m ove to larger
municipalities. Comparatively, 36% of immigrants not in the integration program move to
larger municipaliti es (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 43) . Furthermore, participation in the
integration program has a larger effect on relocation than civil status, age, and children
effects (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 33-57). This suggests that there is a link between
integration resources and an inUlugrant's decision to relocate. In other words, evidence
suppo rts this paper's thesis that institutions strongly affect relocation behavior.
The cultu ral perspective offers an alternative to this institutio nal argu m ent. This
approach argues that because larger municipalities have larger am ounts of co- ethnics,
inunigrants tend to move to larger municipalities (Chiswick and Miller 2002, 4). Evidence
supports this rationale, but it does not prove that culture m otivates relocation. As an
example, a 1% increase in the local number of inulligrants decreases the relocation rate by
9. 5% for m en and 17% for wom en (D amm and R osholm 2005, 22). As the number of
immigrants increases in an area, the greater the likelihood that inulligrants will choose to
stay. Conversely, as iml1ugrants become less numerous, the m ore inunigrants tend to move.
This pattern suggests that cultural preference to live aillong co-ethnics may account for an
increase in the rate of relocation. H owever, other evidence shows that economic preference
m ay account for this pattern as well . Co-ethnic networks account for 55% of the employed
inunigrant population, whereas institutions account for 15% of j obs am ong the employed
inUlugrant population (Schultz-Nielsen 2005, 75) .4 Comparatively, networks account for
44% of j obs am ong employed Danes w here institutions account for 10% of j obs (SchultzNielsen 2005, 75). In other words , co-ethnic netwo rks are relatively m ore important for an
imnugrant's employm ent opportunities than for a D ane's .
This suggests that employm ent opportunities motivate immigrants to form enclaves.
While culture may still motivate il1Ulugrants to live am ong co- ethlucs, the evidence does
not directly prove this explanation. Instead , it strongly suggests that underlying labor market
institutions affect relocatio n behavior am ong inUlugrants. So far, evidence supports the
institutional explanation because it shows that integration resources decrease relocation rates
by 30% (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 43). Further evidence suggests that lab or m arket
institutions likely affect place of relocation. To further test whether labor market institutions
cause relocation and what the consequences of enclaves are for employm ent, I look at
municipal unemploym ent rates.
Municipal unemploym ent rates affect w here inUlugrants m ove to, but have only a
slight effect on h ow often inunigrants relocate. Interestingly, inUlugrants that relocate have
higher rates of employm ent compared to il1Ulugrants that do not relocate (D anull and
Rosholm 2005, 23-24/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 46-47). In addition , inllnigrants tend to
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move away from municipalities with high unemployment rates (Nielsen and Jensen 2006,
46). This strongly suggests that employment opportunity motivates relocation among
immigrants; however, both studies by Danm1/ Rosholm and Nielsen/Jensen counter with
this institutional approach with an important point. After controlling for socioeconomic
factors, they suggest that employment rates alone are not enough to account for inmugrants'
decision to move. However, the evidence does suggest that municipal unemployment rates
help inmugrant enclaves to form insofar as they affect the place of relocation. To tlus !inuted
extent, this supports this paper's thesis that institutions help cause enclaves to form. So far,
institutions seem to affect relocation behavior slightly more than immigrant culture. And if
institutions have a stronger influence, it suggests that changing policy is a viable option for
changing inmugrant relocation behavior. This is important because it counters the notion
that complete repatriation or massive culture change are the only viable solutions for the
low inmugrant employment rates. In order to find how institutions might be part of a third
solution, the next portion of this paper exanunes the econonuc effects of inmugrant
enclaves.
Evidence decisively counters the prediction that imnugrant enclaves lead to poor
econonuc and integration outcomes. Most inmugrant enclaves develop in large
municipalities. Large municipalities , on average, have more favorable labor market
characteristics (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 46/ Danun and Rosholin 2005, 24). Favorable labor
market characteristics accelerate the speed at which inmugrants find their first job (Danun
and Rosholin 2005, 20). And having a job significantly increases the rate of language
acquisition, even after controlling for socio-econonuc characteristics (Clausen and Husted
2005,13). This suggests that the development of inmugrant enclaves provide positive
economic and integration outcomes.
These positive outcomes call into question the effectiveness of Denmark's inmugrantplacement policy. Using a counterfactual-simulation model, Damm and Rosholm find that
the pre-1 999 placement policy did not promote the integration process. Indeed, a removal
of the policy might have quickened integration rates, because the immigrant relocation
process delayed their entrance into the labilr market (Danun and Roshom 2005,29). This
suggests that an equal distribution of inunigrants may not be optimal policy. Despite this,
the post- 1999 policy still operates on the assumption that an even spread of inmugrants is
best, and distinguishes itself from the previous policy by discouraging relocation. It
discourages relocation by withholding integration resources from inunigrants that move. If
D anun and Rosholin's counterfactual predictions are correct, the post-1999 policy should
then still be delaying integration rates. Prelinunary evidence supports this prediction in the
long-term, but suggests that this is not the case for the first four years of residence. In fi gure
1, the post-1999 policy seems to increase imnugrant employment rates for the first four
years relative to the pre-1999 policy (Leibig 2007 , 35).
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Figure 1: Employment rates by duration of residence in Denmark, men and women, 16-64
years old, 1999 and 2004 5
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The initial increase in employm ent rates corresponds to the four-year integration
programs that municipalities implem ented under the post-1 999 policy. This suggests that
integration resources play a critical role in improving employment and integration
outcomes for immigrants. After the first four years of residence, h owever, the post- 1999
policy seems n ot to have any distinct advantage over the previous policy. Post-1 999
employm ent rates even dip below previous rates at the seven-year mark . A plausible
.; explanation for this is that the incentive for an immigrant to relocate might be latent due
to integration program s in the first four years. Tlus suggests that, after the first four years, the
post- 1999 policy has the same inefficiencies as its predecessor, and that Damm and
R osholm's prediction is still at play. In other words, inunigrant- placement policy m ay still
be slowing the integration process in the long term . This conclusion is tentative because this
policy is relatively new and its long-term effects renun largely unknown. The prelinunary
eviden ce does however support this paper's thesis about how D enmark could improve its
inmugrant-placem ent policy, namely, that policy can improve by taking municipal
integration resources and inmugrant preferences into greater consideration. By increasing
integration resources, the post-1 999 policy improved short-term employm ent outcom es.To
improve long-term employment outcomes, policy should let irml1igrant preferences
deternune initial placem ent.

1.3

INSTITUTIONS AND IMPROVING IMMIGRANT-PLACEMENT POLICY

SO far the evidence offers some prelinunary conclusions. Inmugrants relocate to
enclaves for access to integration resources and co- ethnic n etworks. Econonuc m otives
likely explain why inmugrants want access to co- ethnic networks, but cultural reasons are

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/6

Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

43

still plausible. Muni cipal integration resources and unemployment rates help cause
inillligrant enclaves to form. Integratio n resources increase relocation rates. Unemployment
rates affect the destinatio n of imnligrant relocation . Because institutions seem to encourage
the developm ent of immigrant enclaves, I accept tllis part of the institutional approach.
Because inunigrant culture remains plausible, I do not reject the cultural approach. This does
not mean policymakers should discard inunigrant culture as a cause, but rather, that they
should put it into proper perspective.
In addition, immigrant enclaves lead to certain positive employment and integrati on
outcomes. This counters the prediction that enclaves signal a dire future for Denmark.
Policym akers often assume that enclaves slow the rate of integration; however, the evidence
suggests that relocation increases the rate of integration. Policymakers also assume that
imnligrant enclaves develop in places with low labor demand; however, relocation clearly
increases employm ent opportunities for inillligrants. In making these conclusions, this paper
assumes that imnligrants relocate to places w here enclaves are developing. Nielsen and
Jensen 's data supports this assumption (see Appendi x B). In short, the prediction that
inunigrant enclaves wi]] lead to poor econonll c and integration outcomes seems
exaggerated and inaccurate. In light of tllis, Dallish immigrant-placement policy sh ould do
two things. Policy should continue to support municipal integratio n resources and begin to
allow immigrant preferen ce to determ.ine the initial place of residence.The next section will
provide evidence that supports these policy reconunendations.
2. Low EMPLOYMENT IN IMMIGRANT ENCLAVES
Up to this point, this paper has accounted for the latter part of the enclaveemploym ent paradox. R emember, the paradox is that wllile immigrant enclaves have low
employment rates, inunigrants that move to enclaves have high employment rates (Nielsen
and Jensen 2006, 41 I Danun and R osholm 2005,22) .This paper has thus far maintained that
enclaves help integration because inunigrants that move to them are more likely to get a
job. The question then remains, if inunigrant enclaves help, why do they still hurt? In other
words, what accounts fo r the low employment rates in inunigrant enclaves? This section
asserts that the high number of refu gees in inunigrant enclaves largely accounts for low
employm ent rates.
This part of the enclave-employment paradox is relevant for Danish policymakers.
Currently, the employment gap between the non-OECD and native population is fourteen
percentage points in Derunark (Liebig 2007, 11) . In addition, most non-OECD inillligrants
in D enmark live in enclaves (Clausen and Hununelgaard 2007, 20) .This suggests that a close
look at the conditions of inunigrant enclaves could lend insight as to w hy employm ent rates
remain low among inunigrants. Ultimately, a better understanding of enclave conditions
could lead to better policy decisions. Thus, the next portion of this paper will investigate
whether institutio nal, cultural , or reason- for-migration effects account for low employment
among inunigrants in enclaves. 6 This paper asserts that, while the institutional and cultural
fa ctors have an influence, inunigrants' reason-for- nligration in large measure accounts for
low employment in imnligrant enclaves. Section 2.1 addresses recent literature's claims and
lays out this paper's method for testing these claims. Sections 2.2 , 2.3,2.4, and 2.5 consider
the impact of integration m easures, welfare program s, reason-for- lnigrationl country- oforigin, and self-employment respectively on enclave employm ent rates. Section 2.6
concludes.
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2.1 IMMIGRANT CULTURE, NATIVE INSTITUTIONS OR REFUGEES
COl1mlOn explanations for inmugrant low employment break along cultural and
institutional lines. The cultural camp asserts that Muslims have a strong aversion to work
(Camre 2006, 207). Tlus approach argues that because of Islamic culture, only a small
number of non-OECD inmugrants will be able to work in a western society (Camre 2006,
195). An example of the cultural rationale here is instructive. A devout Muslim will refuse
to work in a place that may result in interaction with the opposite sex, or where employers
do not allow for prayers five times a day. For followers of the Wahabi order of Islam,
appearance plays an important role. Wahabi males will generally grow beards and wear a hat.
Thus, when a profession requires the removal of beards and hats,Wahabi Muslims will often
disnuss the employment opportunity. Self-employment thus becomes an attractive option
for the devout Muslim inmugrant because it allows them to earn money without
compromising religion. But if Islanuc culture causes low employment among non-western
immigrants, how does one account for low employment among western inmugrants as well?
Inmligrants in Denmark, regardless of where they come from, have lower em.ployment rates
than the native-born population (Liebig 2007 , 5).
The second explanation accounts for this exception by adding that institutions also
cause low employment among non-western inmugrants. This approach argues that Danish
institutions, reflected in low returns on foreign qualifications, restrict many imnugrants from
entering the workforce (Nannestad 1999, 196-197/Clausen and Hunm1elgaard 2007,21).
Prohibitive policy, according to this argument, reflects a bigotry that is willing to donate aid
to foreign countries but labels foreigners as incapable of work or undesirable as colleagues
(Bawer 2006,70-72). The first app·r oach faults inmugrant culture where the second blames
native institutions for the low employment rates in inurugrant enclaves. Whether the
explanation· is culture or institutions is an important question . If enclaves have poor
employment because of culture, it leaves Denmark with two Herculean tasks: either largescale culture change or massive repatriation. If enclaves have poor employment because of
policy, however, it leaves Denmark with a more feasible choice: namely, to improve its
institutions in inmugrant enclaves. While these are not the only two explanations, they both
are mainstays in public opinion and official policy (Gaasholt and Togeby 1995 , 147-65).
To address this part of the enclave-employment paradox, I operationalize institutions
as integration measures and welfare programs. I operationalize culture as country-of-origin
effects and an imnugrant's choice to be unemployed rather than self-employed. To evaluate
this paper's thesis that refugees largely account for low enclave employment, I operationalize
refugee as an illmugrant's reason-for-nugration. I defend these choices in the sections to
follow.
2.2

IMPACT OF INTEGRATION MEASURES ON EMPLOYMENT

If, as the institutional approach suggests, a lack of integration measures lower
employment, then as integration measures improve, there should be a corresponding rise in
employment rates. Evidence supports this hypothesis. After 1999 and especially after 2001,
Denmark adopted sweeping measures that focused on integration. In the years that
followed , non-western inmugrants that had arrived within one to seven years began to enter
the labor market more quickly and more often relative to the pre-1999 policy, as can be seen
in Figure 1. The new integration policy accelerated the trend of convergence between
foreign- and native- born employment rates and increased employment probabilities for
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immigrants across the board (Liebig 2007, 35). Tills evidence suggests that integration
measures strongly affect employment rates in the short-term. In Figure 1, the accelerated
rate of employm ent in the first seven years of residence supports the prediction that
institutions influence employm ent. H owever, the slight downward turn after the seven-year
mark complicates the picture. Why do institutional effects decrease after the first sevenyears? T he cultural approach offers an explanation for tills downward turn. For example,
employment might taper off because of receding integratio n incentives and resurgent
country-of-origin effects, su ch as Islamic culture. The features shown in Figure 1 do not
support disprove tills explanation, so it remains plausible. So far, the evidence could support
either explanation. Another study helps locate the causes for these patterns more precisely.
During the sam e time period (1999-2006), municipal integration measures accounted
for 22% of the employment rate among inunigrants. N o n-municipal causes---such as
immigrant age, civil status, children, period of residence, h ealth , and country-of-originaccounted for 78% of the inu11.igrant employment rates (Husted and Nielsen and H einesen
2007,9) .Tlus shows, in a fairly precise way, that sometillng other than institutions has a large
effe ct on employm.ent rates in enclaves. The fact that country-of-origin is in the 78% group
suggests that culture may have a stronger effect than institutions o n inunigr.mt employment.
Furthermore, the data from the study show that integration measures are most effective in
areas with inU1ugrant enclaves. As an example of tills, Figure 2 shows that integration
programs have above average success rates in municipalities with large numbers of
immigrant enclaves (Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007,59- 60).
Figure 2. Success rate for immigrants in integration programs (1999-2006)

Municipalities with many immigrant enclaves
Denmark

Copenhagen

Arhus

Esbjerg

36%

53%

40%

37%

Municipalities with little or no immigrant enclaves
Denmark

Silkeborg

Skive

SOf0

36%

30%

19%

31 %

Note: Figures show the percelllage of immigrants that complete a program with a job or in education

Figure 2 also shows that integration program s have below average success rates in
municipalities with little o r no enclaves. In short, integration programs in municipalities
with enclaves produce better employment outcomes compared to municipalities with little
or no enclaves. Tills suppo rts the rationale that, because small municipalities lack scale
econonues for integration programs, inu11.igrants have poorer employment outcomes in
smaller municipalities (Liebig 2007, 62) . It also suggests that integration measures do not
lower employment rates in inunigrant enclaves. So far, it seems institutions help employment
rates in enclaves wh.ile i.l1unigrant culture effects on enclave- employment rates rem ain
unclear. N ext, this paper will deternune w hether welfare programs are an institutional cause
for low employm.ent in enclaves.

2.3

IMPACT OF WELFARE PROGRAMS ON EMPLOYMENT

If the institutional explanation is correct, than welfare programs should discourage
inmugrant employment. Evidence supports tills explanation . Welfare programs lead to lower
employment rates among inunigrants because they give strong incentives to remain
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unemployed . D enmark's welfa re benefits for the unemployed are alllong the highest in the
OEeD. Tlus is b ecause D enmark 's welfare schem e relies on flat- rate benefits, w hich result
in very high net replacem ent ra tes for low form er incom e levels (Liebig 2007, 37). T hese
features can lead to an odd incentive situation called an unemploym ent trap, w here the
incentives of unemploym ent offset the incentives of employm ent (Pedersen 2005, 17). M any
inunigrants in D enmark are in unemploym ent traps. Betwee n 15-30% of unemployed
inunigrants would lose m oney by working (Schultz-Nielsen 2001, 55). Equally important
are inunigrant perceptions about unemploym ent adva ntages. Here, Schultz-Nielsen finds
that 22% of unemployed non-western inunigrants believed they would receive less or equal
pay if they had a j ob (2001,80). This suggests that unemploym ent can, in some cases, be an
econonlic preference instead of a cultural choice. T his supports the institutional explanation
for low employm ent outcom es.
Other surveys about unemploym ent benefits support the cultural explanation .
Schultz-Nielsen observes that un employed inmugrants were less willing to accept long
conU1ll1te times for a n ew j ob than unemployed D anes (2001,77-78). Whether this
difference in preference reflects a difference in culture is unclear, but a cultural explanation
is certainly plausible. O n the other hand, unemployed inunigrants were about as w illing as
D anes to m ove in o rder get a new j ob (Schultz-Nielsen 200 1,80) . In sum, it seems that high
unemploym ent benefits discourage employm ent among inunigrants with low incom e, and
unemployed inmugrants seem somewhat less willing than unemployed D anes to becom e
employed . In short, welfare programs lead to lower employm ent outcom es. In this category,
institutions hurt m ore than they help, but in b oth categories so fa r, inunigrant culture effects
rem ain at play. To test for inunigrant culture, the next porti on of this paper will compare
country- of- origin effects relative to reason-for-nugration effects.
2.4 COUNTRY-Of-ORIGIN AND REASON-fOR-MIGRATION EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT
If the cultural explanation is tru e, then an inmugrant's country-of-origin should have
a larger effect on employm ent than an inmugrant's reason to inmugrate. For the following
analysis, an inunigrant's status as a refugee or non-refu gee will represent the reason-fornugration. Evidence strongly counters the cultural explanation. R efugees have signifi cantly
lower employm ent rates than non-refu gee inunigrants (Liebig 2007, 69). In addition, data
shows that reason-for-nugration effects clearly o utweigh the impact of country- of-origin
effects on imnligrant employment rates (Liebig 2007, 69) . Another study supports these
findin gs. Male refu gees from Sri Lanka, Iran and Iraq have 39% employment compared to
66% for male non-refu gees from the sam e countries. In all, there is a 30% difference in
employm ent rates between refu gees and non-refu gees in D enmark (Husted et . aI 2000, 8/
Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007, 84) . In other words, the employment gap between
refu gees and non-refu gees (30%) is comparable to the gap between natives and inunigrants
(30.5%). This evidence brings forward an important question. H ow do non-refu gee
il1mugrant employm ent rates compare to native-born employment rates for this tim e
period? This is a relevant question because if the n on- refu gee rate is comparable to the
native rate, it would also strongly counter the cultural explanation for low inunigrant
employm ent rates. It would suggest that refu gees largely acco unt for overall low
employm ent rates am ong inmugrants.
This, however, is not the case. Among males, the native-born employm ent ra te is 89%
compared to 72% am ong non- refu gee imnugrants (Husted et. a] 2000,8). This suggests that
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other fac tors must acco unt for the remaining 13% gap. In other wo rds, this shows that the
inunigrant culture might account for the gap. Furtherm ore, if this 2001 study included
women, it wo uld probably widen the non-refu gee/native employm ent gap. This is because
immigrant women have lower employment rates than native-born women (Nielsen et . al
2000, 1) . Tlus also suggests inmugrant culture nught discourage women from entering the
workforce. In other words, imm.igrant culture partially accounts for ove rall low employment
among inmugrants. But this only sh ows how culture affects inunigrant employment overall.
It does n ot suggest that culture affects enclave-employm ent rates to the same degree. Indeed ,
further evidence suggests that reason-for-migration effects largely account for low enclave
employm ent rates.
R efu gees largely account fo r low employm ent rates in inmugrant enclaves. With
refu gees and non-refu gees included, the 1995 employm ent rate was 58.5%. Without
refu gees, the employm ent rate was 72% (Husted et. al 2000,8) . Thus refu gees lowered the
inmugrant employm ent rate by 13.5%. This is especially telling for employm ent in enclaves
because D anish policy in 1995 placed refu gees in large municipalities where enclaves we re
m ore likely to form (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 59). This evidence supports tlus paper's thesis
that refu gees largely acco unt for low employment in inun.igrant enclaves. In sum, reasonfor-nugration effects clearly outweigh country-of-origin effects on inlln.igrant employm ent
rates. Wlule inmugrant culture possibly affects employment rates overall, the reason- fornugration definitely affects enclave-employment rates. To further test for inmugrant culture
effects, the n ext section will deternune whether imnugrants prefer unemployment to selfemploym ent.
2.4 IMMIGRANT CULTURE EFFECTS ON SELF-EMPLOYMENT
The cultural approach argues that Islanuc culture engenders a strong aversion to work
among inun.igrants. If this rationale is true, then inun.igrants that learn of and qualify for
benefits over time should becom e gradually more dependent on welfare programs. Evidence
counters this prediction . D ata shows that as an inun.igrant's years of residence increase, the
level of welfare dependency decreases (Blume and Verner 2007, 14,31 ). In other words, nonwestern inun.igrants tend to becom e self-sufficient as they stay in D enmark longer. This
strongly counters the claim that culture engenders an aversion to work among immigrants.
The cultural approach also asserts that inmugrant culture affects the preferred m ode of
employm ent among inmugrants. If this is true, inun.igrants nught select self-employment
even at the price of earning less than other inmugrant wage earners. This approach asserts
that benefits from self-employm ent outweigh the cost of earning less because it allows an
inmugrant to run a business without compronusing religio us belief. Evidence supports this
pred.iction (see Figure 3) (Andersson and Wadensj o 2004, 16).
Figure 3: Mean annual earnings of employed non-western immigrants in Denmark in 1999

Wage earners

$30,3 58

Self-employed

$13,665

Difference in annual wages

$16,873

Compared to non-western inun.igrant wage earners, self-employed non-western
inmugrants earn alm.ost $17,000 dollars less per year. Even compared to unemployed D anes,
self-employed inlln.igrants earn less (Liebig 2007, 40). In other words, inmugrants are willing
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to be self-e mployed even when that means earning less than wage earners. This suggests that
immigrants might ch oose self-employm ent for cultural reasons . H owever, further evidence
counters this cultu ral interpretation. Rece nt data shows that self-employm ent is an escape
ro ute o ut of unemployment fo r many non-western immigrants (Blume et. al 2005 , 221
Andersson and Wadensj o 2004, 16). In addition , b ecause wages and labor demand are
particularly low in immigrant enclaves compared to other areas, m ore immigrants in
enclaves prefer self-employment, w here they can rely o n the enclave fo r continu ed business
(Constant and Z immerman 2005, 13/ Leibig 2007, 48) . In other words, no n-western
inunigrants do not necessarily prefer self- employment to wage earning, but simply prefer
self-employm ent to unemployment. T his suggests that inunigrants do not choose selfem ploym ent for cultural reasons, but rather, choose self- employm ent in order to be m ore
self- sufficient. Liebig com es to a similar conclusion (2007,38). In sum, the evidence shows
that inmligrants over time depend less on welfare and suggests that immigrants prefer selfemployment to welfare dependency.Tllis evidence directly counters the cultu ral explanation
b ecause it dem onstrates that inmligrants' aversion to unemployment is stronger than their
aversion to work.
2.6 REFUGEES, ENCLAVES AND EMPLOYMENT
O n balance, it seems that willie institutions and inmligrant culture have an influence,
the reason-for- migration in large measure acco unts for low employment in inm ligrant
enclaves. Institutions h ave an impact, but because integration m easures and welfa re programs
respectively encourage and discourage employm ent in inmligrant enclaves, it remains
difficult to detennine the net effect. Inulligrant culture may affect overall employm ent rates,
but compared to the reason-for- nligration, the latter likely has a larger effect on enclave
employm ent rates. R efu gees in imnligrant enclaves clearly lower employm ent rates. O f the
three variables this section addressed, the reason-fo r-nligration seems to have the largest
effect .T his suggests that imnligrant enclaves are far less burdensom e than the refu gees within
them are.
In light of this, policymakers should focus legislation o n refu gees rather than
immigrant enclaves. Placement- policy sho uld distribute refu gees evenly througho ut the
country to spread costs am ong municipalities. For no n-refugees, however, policy should
allow inunigrant preference and municipal integration resources to deternline initial
placement. In addition , policymakers should consider encouraging entrepeneurship am ong
inmligrants, foster more lucrative options for the self- employed , and m ove away fro m a flatrate benefit schem e fo r the unemployed . These suggestions com e with a small caveat,
however, as there are certain drawbacks to this paper's m ethods.
T his paper has (at least) two Iinlitatio ns- one large and on e small .The large limitation
is that this paper's three variables- reason-for-nligration, institutions, and inunigrant
culture-do n ot offer a complete picture for why low employm ent rates persist in
imnligrant enclaves . R ecent studies strongly suggest that other causes are at play. These
include age, civil status, number of children , health, local labor demand, and employer
behavior (Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007, 84/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 33-571
Leibig 2007, 48, 59/ C lausen and HUllUnelgaard 2007, 21 ). Because this paper does not
evaluate these variables, it cannot offer a compreh ensive explanatio n for the enclaveemploym ent paradox. The small Iinlitation is that this paper nlisrepresents mainstream
explanations for the enclave-employment paradox by testing M ogens Camre and B ruce
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Bawer's claims. This is because Camre and Bawer represent two sides of what is ultimately
the same anti-inunigration position.7They only represent the far-right portion of the public
discourse on inunigration. Because this paper does not evaluate a broader range of
explanations, it risks being irrelevant to the mainstream discourse.
Despite these lirnitations, this paper contributes to the immigration debate by
pinpointing where hyperbole ends and the core problem begins. This paper considers and
counters three provocative and increasingly popular parts of the anti-inunigration position.
First, the anti-inunigration camp insists that others take their claims seriously and not write
them off as racist. In response to this request, tlus paper tests their culture claim and
concludes that culture is likely a part of the enclave paradox. Their culture claim is not
necessarily racist rhetoric, but it is perhaps a bit overblown. Second , this camp predicts
economic collapse for countries that continue to allow non-western ilTUnigration. They
claim that the only solutions are complete repatriation or massive culture change (Camre
2006, 177, 211). The evidence in this paper proves these claims to be exaggerated and
inaccurate. Enclaves are not the result of inunigrant culture as much as they are a product
of inunigrant economic preferences. In addition, institutions have and can continue to
improve conditions in immigrant enclaves. Tlurd, this camp contends that native institutions
reflect a latent bigotry by pillarizing society. This paper counters this claim by providing
evidence that immigrant decisions, not native institutions, largely account for the
development of enclaves. In sum, there is ample evidence to suggest that institutions can
improve employment rates in inmugrant enclaves by providing resources to refugees.
Therefore, while Denmark should not discard culture as a cause, it should not let it distract
policy decisions. In short, the hype about enclaves should not divert the focus on refugees.
END NOTES

1. 11TU1ugrant enclaves are residential districts in Dalush municipalities where at least 50%
of the population are inunigrants. As an example, the residential district N0rrebro in
Copenhagen has 24.1% immigrants compared to all of Copenhagen's 16.5% (Olsen
and Hansen 2001, 23) . These enclaves range in size. They can be a single aparunent
complex, such as Langelinje in Silkeborg, or an entire residential district, such as
N0rrebro in Copenhagen.
2. In particular, this paper bases it conclusions on studies of Denmark's dispersal policy
from 1986 to 1998 and 1999 to 2007 respectively. See Danun and Rosholm (2005)/
Nielsen and Jensen (2006).
3. Pillarization alludes to the Dutch word verzeilung. It refers to a Dutch mode of
tolerance that emerged in the late nineteenth century. The system of verzeilung at
that time featured groups that coexisted separately and only interacted at the level
of government, such as the Catholics and Socialists.
4. Institutions defined as jobs provided by the job center, the unemployment insurance
fund, or the municipality.
5. In Figure 1, Leibig holds native-born employment rates constant in order to depict the
extent to ' which foreign-born rates are converging with native-born rates.
6. "Reason-for-lnigration" is how this paper operationalizes the effect that a refugee has
on employment compared to a non-refugee inmugrant.
7. Mogens Camre, a leader in the Danish People's Party and member of the European
Parliament, is an outspoken anti-inmugration politician. Bruce Bawer is an
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American journalist who has boosted his career by criticizing Islamic culture and
Europe's open embrace of Muslim immigrants.
ApPENDIX A

Tllis map represents the distribution change between Denmark post-1999 placement
policy and the pre-1999 placement policy. Green municipalities received more immigrants
after 1999, while yellow m.unicipalities received less immigrants (Nielsen and Jensen 2006 ,
74).

Larger municipalities known for their large immigrant enclaves received less
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immigrants after 1999. These municipalities include Copenhagen, Arhus, Odense, Aalborg,
Skive, Kolding, and Esbj erg. This suggests that current policy seeks a more even distribution
of inunigrants throughout the country.

B
This map shows the distribution of ilmnigrants that moved for the first time from
1997 to 2005 (Nielsen and Jensen 2006,41).

ApPENDIX
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There is a clear tendency for ilmnigrants to move to cities with large inunigrant
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populations.These cities include Copenhagen, Arhus, Odense, Esbjerg,Aalborg, Kolding and
Vejle.
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